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Abstract 
As the Coast Guard endeavors to close the operational gaps created by the 
postponements in the National Security Cutter (NSC) delivery schedule, it is 
important to assess the cost implications of Small Unmanned Aerial Systems 
(sUASs) on the NSC with reasonable accuracy. The purpose of this research was to 
conduct a life-cycle cost (LCC) analysis of sUAS deployment on the Coast Guard’s 
National Security Cutters and Offshore Patrol Cutters to assist the program 
management team. Our research provides the program management team with an 
LCC analysis tool that incorporates the most current and accurate data available. 
We also provided research on current and emerging technologies in the sUAS field 
that could benefit the Coast Guard (e.g., swarm technology). Further, as the Coast 
Guard sUAS acquisition program requirements potentially change, our LCC analysis 
tool provides the program team with a custom tailored instrument that they can 
update themselves and use in providing accurate forecasting of LCC and program 
decision-making.  
Keywords: Unmanned Aircraft Systems, National Security Cutter, Offshore 
Patrol Cutter, Life-Cycle Cost, Swarm Technology 
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Aparicio and Wagner (2012) completed an analysis of the logistics support for 
the small unmanned aerial system (sUAS) program aboard Coast Guard National 
Security Cutters (NSCs). This research was conducted in support of the Coast 
Guard Office of Aviation Acquisition to “conduct a life-cycle cost analysis and 
evaluate integrated logistics support needs of the sUAS program while comparing 
strategies of contractor or organic logistics support” (Aparicio & Wagner, 2012, p. v). 
The Coast Guard has continued work on the sUAS program, and many of the 
associated project documents and guidance have been updated to reflect decisions 
made on the direction and scope of the program. The sUAS program is a Coast 
Guard non-major acquisition and is approaching Acquisition Decision Event (ADE) 2 
in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Acquisition Timeline, highlighted by 
the red box in Figure 1. 
 
 Capital Planning and Investment Control and the Acquisition  Figure 1.
Management Framework Highlighting ADE 2  
(Department of Homeland Security [DHS], 2008) 
The Coast Guard has conducted and is in the process of continuing proof of 
concept demonstrations using sUAS air vehicles on NSCs. These demonstrations 
have been used to fine-tune requirements and operational profiles—information that 
is vital to accurately describe stakeholder requirements that will be used in the 
acquisition project. Based on this work in the Analyze/Select phase of the acquisition 
timeline, the Coast Guard is moving forward with an sUAS solution to meet an 
immediate need: filling a capabilities gap resulting from a lack of air surveillance 
capabilities, as reported by a 2009 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report: 
Delays in the delivery of the NSC and the support assets of unmanned 
aircraft and small boats have created operational gaps for the Coast 
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Guard that include the projected loss of thousands of days in NSC 
availability for conducting missions until 2018. Enhancements to the 
NSC’s capabilities following the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the effects of 
Hurricane Katrina were factors that contributed to these delays. Given 
the delivery delays, the Coast Guard must continue to rely on WHECs 
[high endurance cutters] that are becoming increasingly unreliable. 
Coast Guard officials said that the first NSC’s capabilities will be 
greater than those of a WHEC; however, the Coast Guard cannot 
determine the extent to which the NSC’s capabilities will exceed those 
of the WHECs until the NSC’s support assets are operational, which 
will take several years. To mitigate these operational gaps, the Coast 
Guard plans to upgrade its WHECs and use existing aircraft and small 
boats until unmanned aircraft and new small boats are operational, but 
because the mitigation plans are not yet finalized, the costs are largely 
unknown. Also, the Coast Guard has not yet completed operational 
requirements for the unmanned aircraft or new small boats. As a result, 
the Coast Guard has not determined the cost of the WHEC upgrade 
plan or the operational gap created by the delay in fielding new support 
assets for the NSC. (Government Accountability Office [GAO], 2009) 
The NSC was designed to have a large unmanned aerial system (UAS) 
onboard to enhance its capabilities, but the delays in the NSC procurement and the 
high cost of large UASs have prevented this capability from materializing. Therefore, 
the Coast Guard is pursuing the sUAS as an interim solution.  
 PURPOSE B.
The purpose of this project is to conduct a life-cycle cost (LCC) analysis for 
the deployment of sUASs on the Coast Guard’s current and future NSCs and 
Offshore Patrol Cutters (OPCs). An LCC analysis is required prior to Milestone 
Decision Authority approval to move past ADE 2 and into the Obtain phase of the 
project. Aparicio and Wagner (2012) conducted an LCC analysis for NSC 
deployment with a focus on the logistics support structure and recommendations. 
Our analysis builds on their work, with the addition of the OPC class of cutters and 
incorporates project decisions made to date.  
In support of the LCC analysis, we collected information pertaining to the 
current state of technology of sUASs to ensure that any relevant factors were 
considered when analyzing the LCC implications to the Coast Guard. These factors 
were incorporated into the life-cycle cost to the greatest extent possible, but some 
may represent technological advances with tactical implications that will require 
changes to the current Concept of Operations (CONOPS).   
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 SUMMARY C.
In our research, we attempted to accurately forecast the life-cycle costs of 
sUAS aboard NSCs and OPCs. The Coast Guard is currently trapped in a vicious 
cycle of supporting aging assets that are costing more and more money to support, 
such as the high endurance cutters (WHECs). The funding used to support the 
aforementioned assets is competing with the need to procure and support the NSC 
fleet. The handicapping of NSCs caused by the lack of UAS capability greatly 
reduces the Coast Guard’s mission effectiveness and congressional funding 
support, furthering the need to keep the WHECs operational. This life-cycle cost is 
an important component in the process of procuring an sUAS as an interim solution 
to enhance NSC capabilities and break this vicious cycle. 
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II. BACKGROUND, CURRENT STATUS OF TECHNOLOGY AND 
TACTICS, AND CONOPS CHANGES 
 PURPOSE A.
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the current state of Coast Guard 
directives, sUAS technology, and future tactical implications. Our project is an 
extension of Aparicio and Wagner (2012). Since their work, there have been updates 
in directives that have affected the LCC of the project. Market research in sUAS 
technology provides the Coast Guard with information updates on how the Navy and 
other agencies are developing sUAS technology. The technology explained in the 
following sections has the potential to enhance the Coast Guard’s core mission 
capabilities.  
 SUAS UTILIZATION IN NAVAL OPERATIONS B.
In addition to the standard use of sUASs for intelligence surveillance and 
reconnaissance missions, the Navy utilizes sUASs to fulfill several other mission 
requirements: surveying and collecting samples from nuclear, biological, and 
chemical (NBC) sites; locating snipers; tracking submarines; aerial relay 
communication; search and rescue; suppression of enemy air defense; and aerial 
raid decoys. The following is a brief summary of different mission sets and the sUAS 
packages that have the potential to be of use to the Coast Guard. 
1. Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical sUAS Detection Systems 
Boeing has developed a biological collection and detection unmanned aerial 
vehicle (UAV), called ScanEagle, as a component in its Biological Combat 
Assessment System. Its intelligence surveillance reconnaissance (ISR) sensors are 
utilized to observe NBC sites and send the data back to the control station to assist 
in forecasting an NBC dispersal model. The sUAS is also outfitted with special 
sensors consisting of “five modular cartridges and four “pass through” particle 
collectors, enabling multiple measurements” (“InSitu, Boeing,” 2009). It is controlled 
by satellite and has the capability of travelling 250 nautical miles and then loitering 
over the area for an hour (“InSitu, Boeing,” 2009, p. 2). 
2. Meteorological Data and Research 
sUASs are replacing many of the functions previously fulfilled by weather 
balloons. sUASs with the sensors to collect atmospheric data help the Navy to better 
understand how the weather and other natural anomalies affect the Navy’s radar 
and communications platforms. Also, sUASs can assist the Navy by providing better 
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meteorological data, which allows for more accurate naval gunfire capabilities, as 
suggested in the following quotation: 
“In the old days, we launched weather balloons to give us the best data 
on the real environment, but that only happened in one place and at 
one time of day,” said Cmdr. Rob Witzleb, head of capabilities and 
requirements on the staff of the Oceanographer of the Navy. “Many 
miles and hours later, we were often left looking for answers when 
weapon systems didn’t perform the way we thought they would. Using 
UAVs is a giant leap forward in that they can give us near-continuous 
data, across multiple parameters where the atmosphere is the most 
unpredictable. (Beidel, 2013) 
3. Aerial Relay Communication Drones  
The Navy has begun researching the development of sUASs with 
communication relay packages (CRPs) “to extend the range of terrestrial 
communication—primarily radios” (Cheney-Peters, 2013). This technology has three 
practical applications. First, an sUAS with a CRP can extend line-of-sight 
communications and act as an additional medium to transmit and enhance data 
exchange rates. Secondly, during operations, it can act as a secondary means of 
communication architecture in the event that the primary means is “degraded, 
denied, or compromised” (Cheney-Peters, 2013). Lastly, in humanitarian aid/disaster 
response (HA/DR), the CRP can be utilized to fill the gaps in the communications 
grid when cellphone towers are damaged, or to enhance existing “communications 
past its normal quality, range, or security” (Cheney-Peters, 2013). 
4. Search and Rescue 
The Navy’s research in swarm technology, which we cover in more depth 
later in this chapter, significantly improves the success rate in search and rescue 
operations. As time increases, the search area increases exponentially in maritime 
search operations. Swarm technology allows multiple sUASs to work in tandem to 
cover larger areas and communicate back to a single ground control station. Not 
only does this utilization of sUASs improve search and rescue outcomes, but it also 
has cost-savings implications.  
5. Tracking Submarines 
The Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division (NAWCAD) is working with 
Boeing to modify the ScanEagle to assist in identifying and tracking submarines. The 
UAS diesel engine is converted so that it can operate in a “magnetically silent” mode 
in order to allow it to effectively utilize its “magnetic anomaly detection systems 
tracking submarines underwater” (“InSitu, Boeing,” 2009, p. 2). The ScanEagle is air 
inserted by parachute from a P-8A utilizing the MagEagle Compressed Carriage. 
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When the parachute decelerates to a specified altitude and speed, the sUAS will 
separate from the parachute and “deploy its wings and start the engine to begin the 
mission” (“InSitu, Boeing,” 2009, p. 2), all the while remaining magnetically silent. 
This capability will facilitate the Navy in conducting simultaneous low- and high-
altitude “anti-submarine warfare and command-and-control intelligence, surveillance, 
and reconnaissance missions” (“InSitu, Boeing,” 2009, p. 3) and allows for two 
separate identifications of a single target.    
6. Aerial Raids 
The Navy continues to develop sUAS technology to create more effective 
offensive operational capabilities. sUASs are being considered as an effective way 
to conduct aerial swarm raids to neutralize radar defenses by saturating the target 
acquisition area with a swarm of drones that either operate as decoys, or have 
weapons payloads to destroy designated targets. The implementation of these 
tactics has the potential to be vastly more cost effective than traditional stealth 
technology (Werner, 2013).  
7. Summary 
In conclusion, the Navy has developed sUAS technology that can be utilized 
from several platforms. It can be launched off the deck of ships, air-inserted off of 
planes, or fired out of a submarine tube before it begins its mission. The latest sUAS 
technology has advanced payloads, so the ScanEagle can assist in NBC missions, 
offensive aerial swarm raids, identification and tracking of submarines, search and 
rescue, aerial communications relay, and the collection of meteorological data. 
sUASs demonstrate increasing value and impact in current operations and will play 
an increasing role in the foreseeable future.    
 LETHAL AND NON-LETHAL WEAPONIZING OF SMALL UNMANNED C.
AERIAL VEHICLES 
Recent developments in technology have made the weaponization of sUASs 
more feasible. Previously, only larger UASs like the MQ-1 Predator or the MQ-8 Fire 
Scout had the payload capability to provide weapons capabilities. A careful review of 
the recent advancements in technology highlight an evolutionary reduction in the 
capabilities gap between the MQ-8 Fire Scout and the ScanEagle, which could 
facilitate the ScanEagle’s becoming a viable long-term solution to the Coast Guard’s 
mission requirements. 
The Coast Guard’s current CONOPS states that the UASs’ primary mission is 
to support the host cutter in surveillance, detection, classification, and identification, 
and support mission tasks by providing sensors that will assist in command, control, 
communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR; 
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DHS, 2011). The weaponization of sUASs could further leverage the assets 
capabilities to assist the cutter commanding officer in achieving his mission. 
Weaponizing assists in reducing the inherent risk faced by members of the Coast 
Guard during law enforcement operations including interdiction, vessel boarding, 
and search and rescue operations. Rather than just being a sensor that loiters over 
a target of interest until the cutter or short-range recovery helicopter arrives, the 
sUAS can provide real-time responses to meet mission requirements.  
1. Weapons Management Suite Generation Two Fire Control Station 
The Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division (NAWCWD) Weapons 
Management Suite (WMS) team has been developing technology to weaponize 
existing UAVs since 2004. They are located at China Lake, CA, and have 
demonstrated a miniaturized fire control system, weighing approximately two 
pounds, called the Weapons Management Suite Generation Two (WMS GEN2). 
This system is capable of providing communications to small unmanned aerial 
vehicle (sUAV) weapons and payloads. Additionally, it can “control four stores 
points, two video streams, a digital recorder, and a link to other avionic system 
through a MiL1553 data bus interface” (Hatcher, 2012). The NAWCWD’s WMS 
teams plan to test the WMS GEN2 on sUAVs weaponized with Spike missiles, 
ScanEagle guided munitions (SEGM), or GPS guided munitions (G2M; Hatcher, 
2012). Figure 2 provides a picture of WMS GEN2. 
 
 Spike Missile and WMS GEN 2  Figure 2.
(Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division [NAWCWD], 2010) 
2. Mini Weapons for sUAVs 
a. Spike Missile 
The Spike missile was originally developed by Israeli company Rafael 
Advanced Defense System to be shoulder fired, but it can be modified and attached 
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to existing sUAS platforms. The Spike missile weighs 5.2 pounds and is 2.25 inches 
in diameter. It is 25 inches long and has a one-pound warhead, and “it’s powered by 
a small solid rocket motor and guided by a tiny 1-megapixel video camera” 
(Matthews, 2010). The target is acquired by using an electro-optical seeker “Semi-
Active Laser (SAL) to engage laser designated targets from a distance of two miles” 
(“Arming the Shadows,” n.d.). Each missile costs $5,000, making it extremely cost 
effective. The Spike missile has been fired from several UAVs, including the DRS 
Sentry HP and the Army Vigilante unmanned helicopter, where it successfully 
engaged seven targets, one of which was a moving truck that was struck a mile and 
a half away while moving 20 mph. Figure 3 provides a picture of the Spike missile. 
 
 Spike Missile and Fire Control System Figure 3.
(NAWCWD, 2010) 
b. Miniature GPS Guided Munition 
This G2M was developed by ATK and weighs six pounds. It has a 
grenade-sized warhead (four pounds) and is stored and transported in a container 
launcher until it is utilized to engage a target. When the round is ejected from its 
container, three airfoils and fins move into place as the G2M glides in the air towards 
its target. The G2M also has three laser detectors that, when activated, seek the 
target observer’s laser designation to find the target. When this occurs, the G2M’s 
control processor activates the tail fins to make course corrections onto target. The 
G2M has a low signature since it does not utilize any propellant, but it is still capable 
of “diving silently along a glide slope determined to acquire the laser signal reflected 
from the designated target[;] the weapon can develop substantial offset from the 
flight path, reaching targets at significant standoff distance for the UAV, to achieve 
maximum surprise” (“Arming the Shadows,” n.d.). The Shadow UAV is capable of 
carrying a payload of four G2Ms, in addition to its ISR and radio payloads. Figure 4 
provides a picture of a G2M. 
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 G2M Figure 4.
(“Arming the Shadows,” n.d.) 
3. Small-Arms Fire Payloads for sUAS 
At MacDill Air Force Base (AFB), in 2011, Derek J. Snyder, in collaboration 
with United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), conducted a proof of 
concept for arming existing sUASs with small-arms capability payloads for his 
systems engineering master’s thesis. The proof of concept involved attaching a 
small-arms payload weighing approximately 8.5 ounces, which consisted of a 
commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) 2.4-gigahertz electronic trigger, a six-channel 
receiver and COTS spectrum handheld RC radio, a carbon 50-caliber paintball 
barrel loaded with one round, and a 12-gram liquid CO2 propellant. He attached this 
payload to a Raven B (which has a 1.5-pound payload capability). The barrel was 
bore sighted to the Raven’s preexisting camera. The proof of concept testing found 
that the electronic trigger mechanism did not interfere with the Raven’s 
communications system and vice versa. Also, the weapons payload did not have a 
noticeable effect on the aerodynamics of the Raven. The UAS fired eight shots, all of 
which hit within 10 feet of the target. (Wind gusts were a significant factor in the 
paintballs’ accuracy.) Snyder found that a tactical sUAS could “at a minimum, 
distract a target thereby possibly changing the way the adversary views all sUAS” 
(Snyder, 2011, p. 62). 
Snyder’s recommendation for future small-arms payload development was to 
“use current technology small arms weapons that use case-less, electronically-fired 
small arms rounds” (Snyder, 2011, p. 62). The UAS, Snyder (2011) also explained, 
“could be weaponized with a lethal payload made as a ‘kit’ consisting of a 
disposable, extremely light weight (carbon fiber) material that contains multiple 
rounds that could be fired electronically. This would remove much of the weight 
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associated with conventional small-arms weapons” (p. 62). The proof of concept 
results showed that with further development, small-arms payloads added to existing 
sUASs could be a viable option to further enable sUASs to fulfill Coast Guard 
mission requirements with lethal and non-lethal effects. Figure 5 shows a small-arms 
payload added to a Raven B. Figure 6 shows the Raven B outfitted with the small-
arms payload engaging a target. 
 
 Small-Arms Payload Characteristics Figure 5.
(Snyder, 2011, p. 59) 
 
 Small-Arms Payload Firing at Target  Figure 6.
(Snyder, 2011, p. 61) 
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4. Clandestine Tagging, Tracking, and Locating Technologies 
In 2011, the Air Force released a request for proposal for the development of 
tracking technology utilizing tiny drones to covertly paint an “individual with some 
kind of signal-emitting powder or liquid that allows the military to keep tabs on him or 
her” (Dillow, 2011). The Pentagon has a range of ideas pertaining to clandestine 
tagging, tracking, and locating (TTL) technologies, which include “marking targets 
with biological paints or micromechanical sensors. … One proposal from the 
University of Florida “uses insect pheromones encoded with unique identifiers that 
could be tracked from miles away. Other plans employ biodegradable fluorescent 
‘taggants’ that can be scatted by UAVs, or paintballs that can be fired to mark and 
track targets of interest” (Dillow, 2011).  
Voxtel, a technology company from Oregon, has a product available called 
NightMarks, which is a “nanocrystal that can be seen through night-vision goggles 
and can be hidden in anything from glass cleaner to petroleum jelly” (Dillow, 2011, p. 
2). The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency is researching a “smart dust” 
of tiny, dust-sized sensors that could be scattered by UAVs over an area, much like 
a crop duster, so that when a target or person of interest moves through it, they are 
tagged. The aforementioned technologies would be extremely useful to the Coast 
Guard in carrying out interdiction and search and rescue missions (Dillow, 2011).   
 SWARM TECHNOLOGY D.
Swarm technology is emerging and evolving in sUASs. The implementation of 
swarm technology represents a paradigm shift in tactical employment and greatly 
enhances the capabilities of sUASs. It is in the Coast Guard’s best interest to 
carefully follow swarm technology’s advances and plan for its incorporation into 
future Coast Guard operations. 
Leaders in the fields of robotics and engineering have begun to test utilizing 
swarm technology in sUAVs. “In biology a swarm is a collection of individuals that 
manifest complex behavior without a leader calling the shots. Imagine birds 
spontaneously gathering on a single tree, only to lift off en masse moments later” 
(Hambling, 2013). 
Scientists achieve swarms by programing the sUAS software with algorithms 
and rules that make all the individual units move together in the same direction, 
while simultaneously always trying to move to the center of the swarm and to 
maintain a set distance away from each other (Hambling, 2013). Figure 7 provides 
an artist’s representation of swarm technology. 
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 Illustration of an sUAS Swarm Figure 7.
(Hambling, 2013) 
In 2011, Johns Hopkins University and Boeing worked together to 
demonstrate that two different types of UAVs could form a swarm and effectively 
conduct a reconnaissance mission. During the test, they utilized two ScanEagles 
(built by Boeing), and a Unicorn (built by Lockheed Martin). Later in 2012, they 
demonstrated an autonomous swarm of sUASs tasked to search an area, guided by 
just a laptop and tactical radio, suggesting the potential of reducing the amount of 
manpower and ground stations requirements (Werner, 2013).  
The Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) is a leader in the field of swarm 
technology research within the United States. In February 2011, the school’s 
Advanced Robotic Systems Engineering Laboratory (ARSENL), headed by 
Professor Timothy Chung, conducted a field trial consisting of a swarm of seven 
drones. In May 2012, at Camp Roberts, CA, Chung’s team increased the number of 
drones in the swarm to 10.  
Although there have been significant advances in the field, ARSENL’s May 
study highlighted some of the current difficulties that the military may face when 
trying to implement swarm technology presently. “When the school’s team flies five 
at a time, the command-and-control link between the ground station and the aircraft 
goes haywire, sending a ‘warning: lost communications’ message for each aircraft” 
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(Werner, 2013, p. 5). This phenomenon is the result of all of the sUASs trying to 
communicate back to the ground control station simultaneously. To fix the issue in 
future field tests, “school officials plan to employ a command-and-control network 
with more bandwidth … and schedule incoming messages so the multiple aircraft do 
not all bombard their handlers with constant warnings” (Werner, 2013, p. 5). 
Professor Chung plans to conduct the world’s largest swarm demonstration by 
August 2015. The demonstration will consist of a battle between two swarms of 50 
sUASs each. Figure 8 shows Dr. Chung conducting field-testing of swarm 
technology. 
 
 Dr. Timothy Chung Testing sUAS Swarm Technology at the Joint Figure 8.
Interagency Field Exploration on August 5–8, 2013  
(Stewart, 2013) 
sUAS swarm technology has several applications in homeland security. For 
example, it could be extremely effective in search and rescue operations. sUASs 
could quickly cover large areas of space to map and communicate back to a single 
ground control station. This has the potential to drastically improve the chances of 
rescuing civilians in danger, as well as reducing the associated mission’s costs. As 
time progresses in a search and rescue evolution, the required search area grows 
exponentially and the chance of recovering survivors decreases, demonstrating the 
benefit of increased surveillance assets early. 
Also, swarm technology can be utilized to assist in disaster relief. One 
example of swarm technology’s potential use in disaster relief is the Swarming Micro 
Air Vehicle Network Project, which “used the pheromone paths laid down by army 
ants [to] help plot the most economical course for MAVs that would be deploying in 
disaster areas to quickly create communication networks for rescuers” (Quick, 
2011). In the case of an NBC disaster, it may be the safest way to survey the NBC 
disaster site. “Swarms could scan high-risk buildings and sites (think Fukushima 
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post-tsunami) rapidly, whereas larger UAVs cannot” (Hambling, 2013, p. 1). These 
sUAS swarms could utilize newly developed NBC payloads, which could collect 
samples in the disaster area and communicate information back to the ground 
control stations, thereby reducing exposure risks to humans.  
According to Dr. Chung, swarms may be the most cost-effective and only 
viable defense against other swarms. He stated, “I don’t want to spend a million 
bucks to counter a $10,000 threat” (Werner, 2013, p. 3). He further articulated this 
point in the following analogy: 
Even if enemy drones are not sophisticated, they might be able to 
overwhelm U.S. air defenses. It’s like a tennis match. No individual 
high school player could possibly beat Swiss champion Roger Federer. 
But if 50 high school players were lobbing balls onto his court, poor 
Roger wouldn’t be able to defend against that. (Werner, 2013, p. 3) 
In summary, as swarm technology continues to develop and the price of 
sUASs decreases, the field has many promising applications to the Coast Guard’s 
disaster relief missions, search and rescue operations, and maritime law 
enforcement. Meanwhile, Boeing’s development and demonstration of swarm 
technology on the ScanEagle with just a laptop and tactical radio could reduce the 
footprint of the UAS system on NSC, as well as increase the capabilities available to 
commanders. 
 MANNING—WHO SHOULD FLY SUASS IN THE COAST GUARD E.
The Coast Guard has specified that its sUASs will be controlled by a certified 
pilot. This is due to the need for the Coast Guard to operate in domestic airspace, 
and using a certified pilot vice a UAS operator meets or exceeds the current and 
expected Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) requirements. These FAA 
requirements currently limit the Coast Guard to officers who have completed flight 
training and are rated pilots, but the sUAS CONOPS leaves the possibility open that 
the pilot could be an officer or enlisted person (United States Coast Guard [USCG], 
2013b). The requirement of a certified pilot results in a substantially larger cost. 
Heiss (2012) conducted a cost–benefit analysis of the use of officer versus 
enlisted personnel as UAS pilots in the U.S. Army, Marine Corps, Navy, and Air 
Force. The Navy and Air Force require that UASs be operated by rated pilots, while 
the Army and Marines permit enlisted personnel to operate UASs. Heiss’s 
recommendation was that the Navy should consider training enlisted personnel to 
operate its Fire Scout UASs. Conventional wisdom might suggest that a rated pilot 
would be the “pilot” of a UAS, but the majority of UASs do not have to be actively 
flown like the manned aircraft they are replacing. In general, the UAS can be 
controlled by the onboard computer and ground control station to fly at the altitude 
that the operator specifies and will simply go to a position or follow a course that the 
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operator enters, such as a search pattern or loiter-in-vicinity pattern. The actual 
“flying” is done by the computers, so why use an expensive rated pilot to man the 
GCS (Ground Control Station)? 
A financial comparison among UAS operator options requires the definition of 
the representatives. Heiss (2012) used a junior and senior rated pilot, a surface 
warfare officer (SWO), and an operations specialist (OS) in his comparison. He used 
the Navy’s Human Resources Cost Analysis Tool (HRCAT) to extract the amortized 
annual costs for accession and pipeline for these representatives. All of the officers 
had the same accession cost, and all of the enlisted personnel had the same 
accession cost. The pipeline training consisted of all of the training that enabled the 
personnel to perform their missions, for example, flight school for the rated pilots. All 
members would need specific training on the UAS. Navy Fire Scout training is 
conducted by Northrop Grumman Corporation, and Heiss (2012), in his research, 
used $45,833 as the cost to train a rated pilot and $48,077 as the cost to train the 
SWOs and OSs. The pilot cost was based on the average between the costs of Fire 
Scout air vehicle operator (AVO) training and mission payload operator (MPO) 
training given to military pilots. The number used for the SWOs and OSs came from 
the average cost for the same training for non-pilot civilian contractors. Combining all 
of this information together, Heiss (2012) built Table 1. From a strictly financial 
perspective, it is obvious that using enlisted operators makes much more sense than 
using rated officer pilots. Heiss did not limit his analysis to dollars and cents but 
compared other benefits that are summarized as follows. 
Table 1. Total Amortized Annual Cost per Operator Alternative  
(Heiss, 2012) 
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Heiss (2012) followed his financial analysis with non–cost-related factors such 
as the length of training, manning constraints, physiology constraints, culture, and 
safety considerations. All of these factors led Heiss to conclude that enlisted UAS 
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operators are a more efficient use of resources. Fire Scout AVO training takes five 
weeks, and MPO training is three weeks. The training pipeline for a qualified combat 
pilot is as long as four years. The Navy is facing manning constraints in the current 
personnel downsizing environment. Training personnel who are already part of a 
ship’s crew to operate UASs would alleviate the need to augment the crew with 
pilots who come aboard simply to fly the UASs. Pilots have high physical fitness 
requirements to be able to operate in the extremely dynamic cockpit environment. 
This environment does not exist for a UAS because there is no cockpit. Opening up 
UAS controller training to personnel who are qualified for general service, but not 
flight school, would greatly broaden the pool of potential operators. The Air Force 
has had significant cultural difficulties when using pilots to control UASs. The pilot 
culture tends to treat these pilots as second-class citizens. This is detrimental to the 
UAS pilots’ morale and to their careers, even though they are performing a vital 
mission that they are specially trained for. Finally, there is doubt concerning whether 
it is more difficult to teach a pilot who is used to controlling from a cockpit to operate 
a UAS remotely, as opposed to teaching someone who is not a pilot. Also, rotating 
rated pilots through UAS controller duty removes them from their airframe, and from 
a cockpit entirely, for a lengthy period of time. Transitioning back to the cockpit is a 
potentially long and dangerous process. 
Heiss (2102) recommended that the Navy develop and implement programs 
to transition enlisted personnel into UAS controller positions. There is one area that 
he did not discuss that could pose a problem for the Coast Guard, if it followed a 
similar path: civilian airspace. The Navy primarily operates in military training space 
or in combat operations. The Coast Guard also operates in military training airspace, 
but mission time is either on the high seas or in U.S. civilian airspace. FAA 
guidelines have not been finalized on the requirements to operate UAS domestically 
in the airspace controlled by the FAA, but the current thought is that some type of 
pilot license will be required. Since domestic operation is a key requirement of Coast 
Guard UAS missions, until these regulations have been modified to allow no-pilot 
operators, the Coast Guard’s only choice is to have rated pilots operate UASs. 
 CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS DIFFERENCES F.
The CONOPS that Aparicio and Wagner (2012) received from the Coast 
Guard during their study was a draft document titled Concept of Operations for the 
Cutter-Based Unmanned Aircraft System (USCG, 2011). The Coast Guard Office of 
Aviation Acquisitions provided us with an updated, but more narrowly focused, 
document titled Requirements Document for the Small UAS for National Security 
Cutters (USCG, 2013b), which includes the CONOPS created specifically for sUASs 
onboard NSC, in addition to other procurement information such as effectiveness 
requirements, suitability requirements, and key performance parameters (USCG, 
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2013b). A major difference between the two documents is that the older document 
focuses on a larger UAS Level-I Major Systems Acquisition Program while the sUAS 
on the NSC document dramatically tailors the size and capability of the described 
UAS, in addition to providing specific requirements for the UAS. Aparicio and 
Wagner (2012) had some of this information while carrying out their research, which 
was focused on an sUAS, but they did not have the combined document. In our 
research, we explored some of the new information provided by this updated 
document. 
1. Air Vehicle Size 
One of the main differences between the UAS CONOPS and the sUAS 
CONOPS is the size of the airframe. The airframe choice affects all costs associated 
with the system: initial procurement, operations, maintenance, disposal, and 
equipment and tactics on the cutters. Aparicio and Wagner (2012) used the smaller 
sUAS in their study, and our work does as well. 
2. sUAS System Definition  
The UAS CONOPS calls for two UASs onboard the NSC and one aboard the 
OPC. The sUAS CONOPS is focused solely on the NSC and does not mention the 
OPC. Like Aparicio and Wagner (2012), we use two and one sUASs for the NSC 
and OPC, respectively, in our analysis. 
3. Personnel 
In their study, Aparicio and Wagner (2012) used an Aviation Detachment 
(AVDET) of two pilots and three enlisted operator/maintainers. This crew mix was 
based on the draft UAS CONOPS, Coast Guard pilot crew rest requirements 
contained in COMDTINST 3710.1F (USCG, 2008), and federal UAS pilot 
requirements. The Coast Guard provided a preliminary answer to the AVDET in the 
sUAS CONOPS by stating,  
Total sUAS crew will notionally consist of three pilots and four 
maintainers, with a desired complement of two pilots and three 
maintainers. Three pilots provides a conservative approach to meeting 
the 12 hours per day of flight time considering two pilots would be 
operating at the individual flight time limits of 3710.1G daily. (USCG, 
2013b)  
A revision to COMDTINST 3710.1 was released in February 2013, after 
Aparicio and Wagner (2012) completed their study. Major changes included the 
addition of UAS operations and the limitations shown in Table 2 pertaining to UAS 
crew employment (USCG, 2013a). We use the larger AVDET size in our analysis. 
Using a larger AVDET provided a larger but more conservative LCC. As the Coast 
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Guard gains more experience with UASs, the crew size will most likely decrease, 
and the LCC tool will allow the user to make this change at any time. 
Table 2. UAS Flight Scheduling Standards per 24-Hour Period  
(USCG, 2013a) 
 Individual Flight Hours Crew Mission Hours 
Land-Based UAS 10 14 
Shipboard UAS 6 10 
4. Flight Operations Description 
The UAS CONOPS describes the UAS as operating similarly to a MH-65 
helicopter, requiring the flight deck to be clear for Flight Condition (FLIGHTCON) I 
the same way it would be for any helicopter flight evolution. There is a major 
difference in the sUAS CONOPS, which specifies that the sUAS must be launched 
and recovered while an MH-65 is spotted on the flight deck with blades extended. 
This position provides a much greater response capability for the MH-65 because it 
does not have to be removed from the hangar and have the blades unfolded before 
launch; however, it creates a space constraint on the sUAS. This space constraint is 
something that should not negatively affect the universe of choices in the sUAS 
because of its limited launch/recovery footprint requirements. 
5. Automated Launch and Recovery 
The draft UAS CONOPS specifies that the UAS will operate on an automated 
launch and recovery system attached to the cutter. This requirement is focused on 
the large vertical takeoff/landing UAV (VUAV) that was envisioned in the original 
Deepwater plan. The sUAS CONOPS document discusses the smaller UAS and its 
associated launch and recovery machinery, which is not automated. This is a much 
less complex and less expensive approach than the automated system, which is to 
be expected because of the significantly smaller footprint and lower expense of the 
sUAS, in comparison to the larger Fire Scout UAS. 
6. Classification 
The UAS CONOPS calls for the majority of communications to be 
unclassified, but it also states that “the capability to receive, process, and archive 
higher classifications will be required” (USCG, 2011). The sUAS CONOPS specifies 
that “the sUAS shall be an unclassified system” (USCG, 2013b). The removal of 
classified systems has the potential to greatly reduce the LCC due to the expense of 
military-grade classification hardware and software. The sUAS CONOPS also 
describes the requirement for secure and non-secure communications including 
military UHF, which may require additional expensive hardware and software. Our 
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analysis focused on LCC for representative sUAS systems that are being explored 
by the Coast Guard and that meet the Coast Guard’s user requirements. 
 SUMMARY G.
This chapter set the stage for the LCC analysis we conducted and provided 
research into the current and future state of technology for sUASs. Our research is a 
continuation of Aparicio and Wagner (2012), and it is important to clarify where there 
are differences in the data and assumptions we used. This research is not only an 
LCC analysis but also an academic analysis of current and near-future sUAS 
technology. The Navy, Air Force, and other agencies are conducting studies with 
sUASs to enhance existing capabilities and expand sUASs into new areas. The 
specific technologies we highlighted have the ability to greatly enhance Coast Guard 
mission effectiveness and should be given attention by Coast Guard policy and 
technology leadership.  
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The purpose of this project was to conduct a life-cycle cost analysis of sUAS 
deployment on Coast Guard NSCs and OPCs. This analysis required the 
development of a computer tool to integrate all cost feeders and calculate the life-
cycle cost. The advantage provided by the tool is that the inputs and assumptions 
made (such as number of airframes or reliability statistics) can be changed by the 
user to fine-tune the LCC, adjust to changing realities, and fit the project into the 
available financial resources. The Life-cycle Cost Tool will be used by the Coast 
Guard Office of Aviation Acquisitions in support of required documentation for ADE 2 
and beyond.  
 LIFE-CYCLE COST TOOL B.
The Life-cycle Cost Tool is a Microsoft Excel tool that is used to capture the 
cost of individual cost components and combine them to calculate the LCC over the 
entire life of a program. The tool is a derivative of the methodology learned in 
Professor Keebom Kang’s Engineering Logistics class at NPS (Kang, 2013).  
The Defense Acquisition University (DAU) defines life-cycle cost as “the total 
cost to the government of acquisition and ownership of a system over its useful life. 
It includes the costs of research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E), 
acquisition, operations, and support (to include manpower), and where applicable, 
disposal. For defense systems, LCC is also called ‘Total Ownership Cost (TOC)’” 
(“Life Cycle Cost,” 2013). The ability to generate an accurate LCC is vital for the 
acquisition program staff. Leading up to ADE 2, decisions are made that have 
dramatic effects on the LCC of the system. These decisions include contract type 
and terms, scope of the acquisition project, possible solutions, size, weight, 
capabilities, system life, and so forth. Figure 9 is a conservative display of the effects 
of early decisions on later LCC. Over 50% of LCC is committed during the 
Conceptual/Preliminary Design phase, while less than 10% of the LCC is actually 
spent. The Coast Guard’s acquisition timeline is shown in the middle of Figure 10. 
Blanchard and Fabrycky’s (2011) Conceptual/Preliminary Design phase relates to 
the Coast Guard’s Analyze/Select phase, which is before ADE 2, where approval is 
given for the creation of an acquisition project. Before construction begins (at ADE 
3), nearly 80% of LCC has been committed, but less than 25% has been spent. With 
such a large effect on the LCC weighing on early decisions, the program manager 
(PM) must have complete LCC understanding of the effects of these decisions and 
balance them against the affordability of the project. The LCC tool enables the PM to 
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explore multiple scenarios and see immediate impacts to LCC through an easy-to-
understand interface. 
 
 Life-Cycle Commitment, System-Specific Knowledge,  Figure 9.
and Incurred Cost  
(Blanchard & Fabrycky, 2011) 
 
 Capital Planning and Investment Control and the Acquisition Figure 10.
Management Framework  
(DHS, 2008) 
The DAU definition calls out specific elements that are included in the 
calculation of LCC. We developed this LCC tool based on the work conducted by 
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Aparicio and Wagner (2012) and expanded their work to include the addition of the 
OPC fleet, operations on both coasts, and other new and updated information that 
was available to us. Specific cost drivers in the research tool include the following: 
R&D costs necessary to identify and test suitable UAS systems, the procurement 
cost of UAS systems (aircraft, sensors, and control equipment), installation costs, 
some support and maintenance costs, operations costs, and disposal costs. 
Assumptions we made during development of the Life-cycle Cost Tool are 
documented in the Analysis section of our report. The LCC tool has some limitations: 
There are future decisions that need to be made by the Coast Guard; thus, some 
information was not available to us and therefore had to be excluded. For example, 
the Coast Guard must determine a location to base and maintain the UASs on the 
East Coast. Our assumption is that the Coast Guard will use its existing facilities at 
Aviation Logistics Center in North Carolina. On the West Coast, the Coast Guard is 
planning on combining UAS operations with the Navy at Point Mugu, CA.  
A discounted rate of 2% is used in the LCC calculations. Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-94 calls for the use of a discount rate of 
7%, citing, “This rate approximates the marginal pretax rate of return on an average 
investment in the private sector in recent years” (Office of Management and Budget, 
1992). The discount rate takes into account the time value of money; that is, a dollar 
today has more buying power than a dollar tomorrow due to inflation and the fact 
that the money could be earning interest. The reason we chose 2% is this lower rate 
is the internal government investment rate. This rate is used when the project being 
analyzed does not have a public use, such as a weapons system, as opposed to a 
road project which does have a public use. This percentage can be changed by the 
user in the Life-Cycle Cost Model. 
Based on the UAS CONOPS, our model uses a planned UAS airframe life of 
20 years. The length of time that an asset is planned to be used has tremendous 
effects on its LCC. This portion of the life cycle after delivery is funded by operations 
and maintenance (O&M) money and is driven by the planned operations. For 
example, based on the UAS CONOPS, Aparicio and Wagner (2012) calculated that 
flight hours on an NSC would be 832 hours per year. A 20-year life would account 
for 16,640 hours per vehicle. The current sUAS program is planned to be an interim 
solution until funding is available for the acquisition of larger, more capable, and 
more expensive UAS systems. If funding becomes available sooner, the sUAS 
system life may be reduced as it is replaced by another UAS. Conversely, the Coast 
Guard has a habit of making interim solutions permanent and keeping assets longer 
than planned at acquisition. It is possible that the sUAS will be in service to support 
the NSC’s and OPC’s planned 30-year service lives. Changing to 10- or 30-year 
service lives for sUAS would result in 8,320 or 24,960 hours, respectively. Assuming 
a starting value of $1,400 per flight hour, as Aparicio and Wagner (2012) calculated, 
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changing to a 10 or 30 year service life would be a swing of ±$11,648,000 
(undiscounted dollars) in LCC for just one vehicle. With an estimated fleet size of 47 
aircraft, this could be a difference of ±$547,456,000 when compared to the LCC at 
20 years. 
The Coast Guard UAS program is closely tied to the acquisition programs for 
the NSC and OPC. The driver behind the timeline is currently the NSC program, 
which has already delivered three cutters and has three more of the planned eight 
under contract. The large hole in the NSC capability—due to the lack of aerial 
reconnaissance provided by deployed UASs—has caused Congress to ask 
questions about the need to fund continuing NSC procurements if they will not be 
fully mission-capable due to the lack of UASs. The OPC program has not begun its 
procurement, but the UAS is sure to be closely tied to this schedule as well. The 
schedule used in the LCC tool is based on the NSC procurement schedule and 
proposed OPC procurement schedule. 
 LIMITATIONS C.
The LCC tool is limited by the quality and quantity of information that we are 
able to input into the tool. As discussed previously, we had to make assumptions 
based on data non-availability or decisions not yet made. The theory and 
calculations behind the tool are sound and provide the most accurate estimates 
available with the inputs provided. The tool can be modified in the future to include 
better data as it becomes available and as decisions are made.  
 SUMMARY D.
The LCC numbers provided later are based on the best assumptions we were 
able to make. We will brief the Coast Guard program staff on the results, but also on 
how to use the tool and update it as they gain more information and make 
programmatic decisions to further refine the LCC for the UAS program. Through 
continued maintenance and use of this tool, the program staff will be able to make 
the appropriate decisions to shape their program for success even in the currently 
tight fiscal environment. In the appendix we have provided a user manual for the 
LCC tool. The manual explains how to make adjustments to the tool within the 
framework of several scenarios that the program staff may face in decision making.  
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IV. ANALYSIS 
The major output of this project was the Life-Cycle Cost Model for use by the 
Coast Guard Office of Aviation Acquisition. We discussed the tool at a high level in 
the Methodology sections, but the following detailed discussion of the decisions and 
information used to construct the tool is also necessary for understanding and use. 
We built the model in Microsoft Excel and organized it by major cost categories, 
which is the organization used in this section. 
The major cost components in the LCC analysis are acquisition, personnel, 
training, O&M, and project office costs. Each of these topics is contained on an 
Excel tab. In addition, there are tabs for the NSC, OPC, and sUAS schedule; LCC 
compilation; and user interface pages. We discuss each in turn. 
 SYSTEM ACQUISITION COSTS A.
The cost of the system components was provided by the Office of Aviation 
Acquisition and is shown in Table 3 (Office of Aviation Acquisition, personal 
communication, August 8, 2013). This list includes the components that comprise an 
sUAS, with the exception of spare parts. Some components, such as the GCS, will 
be installed permanently on the cutter, while others, such as the air vehicles 
themselves, will be deployed to the cutter before each patrol. 
Table 3. Cost of Equipment to Outfit One Cutter With sUAS, Not Including 
Spares 
Procure Ops Test System 
Airframe Unit Cost - Baseline  $              133,671  
Avionics - Baseline  $              149,047  
Propulsion - HFE - Baseline  $                40,601  
EO/IR - Baseline  $              268,268  
Comms Relay  $              131,301  
AIS  $                  7,851  
GCS - Ship  $              392,054  
Launcher - Ship  $              236,050  
Recovery - Ship  $              236,050  
Peculiar Support Equipment (PSE) per System  $                69,624  
EO/IR surface detect sys  $                75,000  
Remove video terminal for boarding team (1)  $                10,000  
One ship sys with 1 acft  $           1,749,517  
One ship sys with 2 acft  $           2,515,067  
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 PROJECT OFFICE COSTS B.
The procurement costs are simply the costs for the equipment. The project 
office has many other costs to execute the project and install the sUAS systems on 
the cutters. Estimated costs were provided by the project office. Some of these costs 
are personnel, such as travel and support contractors, while others are directly tied 
to delivery and installations.  
1. Operational Testing and First Cutter Delivery 
There are a number of expenses that the project must incur to field and test 
the sUAS system, no matter how many systems are installed. These include non-
reoccurring engineering (NRE), initial training, spectrum certifications, and costs for 
the development and execution of the operational test on the first cutter. In addition, 
there are costs for the shipboard installation, which are generally higher for the first 
installation than for follow-on installations. The total estimated cost for installation 
and testing onboard the first cutter is $2.6 million. A breakdown of these costs is 
shown in Table 4. 
Table 4. Costs to Design, Install, and Test of First NSC 
Ops Test Prep   
Train sUAS pilots ($10K each)  $     40,000  
Spectrum cert  $     25,000  
NSC install (NRE)  $   750,000  
NSC install (recurring)  $   100,000  
Pubs  $     20,000  
Non-pilot initial training  $     50,000  
 …add items such as Flt Cert, Avcert…  $     75,000  
Total Ops Test Prep  $ 1,060,000  
Ops Test (Use STUAS as basis)   
Test plans, OTRR, Test rpt  $     280,000  
Training for Ops Test  $     560,000  
T&E support (e.g., contract mx)  $     280,000  
Test range and targets  $     250,000  
OT spares at 5%  $     125,750  
OT flight ops ($1K/hr)  $        50,000  
Ops Test  $  1,545,750  
We used similar costs for the first OPC, which will require the same 
developmental and testing work that will be completed on the NSC. Assuming that 
there will be cost savings from the reuse of some test planning and training from the 
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NSC tests, these costs were listed as 50% NSC costs. The differences result in 
approximately $600,000 in lower costs. The costs for the first OPC are displayed in 
Table 5. 
Table 5. Costs to Design, Install, and Test of First OPC 
Ops Test Prep   
Train sUAS pilots ($10K each)   
Spectrum cert   
NSC install (NRE)   
NSC install (recurring)   
Pubs  $     20,000  
Non-pilot initial training  $     50,000  
 …add items such as Flt Cert, Avcert…  $     75,000  
OPC install (reoccurring)  $     100,000 
OPC install (NRE)  $     750,000  
Total Ops Test Prep  $     995,000  
Ops Test (Use STUAS as basis)   
Test plans, OTRR, Test rpt  $     140,000  
Training for Ops Test  $     280,000  
T&E support (e.g., contract mx)  $     280,000  
Test range and targets  $     250,000  
OT spares at 5%  $     125,750  
OT flight ops ($1K/hr)  $        50,000  
Ops Test  $  1,125,750  
2. sUAS Delivery Costs 
The cost to deliver sUAS to the follow on NSCs and OPCs are significantly 
less than delivery to the first NSC and first OPC. The NRE costs to develop and 
finalize the installation package have been completed and can be followed with little 
to no modifications. The technical publications have been developed and should not 
need customization. Each cutter will still require initial training when the sUAS 
system is first installed. These costs are expected to be approximately $175,000 per 
cutter.  
3. sUAS Operations Center Costs 
The location for the sUAS operations center has not been finalized, but 
requirements have been developed to describe what equipment and facilities will be 
required. The plan calls for a single airframe sUAS system and spare parts to be 
located at the shore station. There will also be costs similar to those standing up any 
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unit or office, such as office furniture, computers, and space 
modifications/refurbishment. The estimate for these costs is approximately $2 million 
and is displayed in Table 6. 
Table 6. sUAS Operations Center Costs 
sUAS Ops Center   
One acft sys + launch/recover + RVT as above  $ 1,749,517  
Office furniture & supplies [CG-93AL]  $          -    
Std work stations  $      16,800 
Facilities upgrades [CG-93AL]  $          -    
Initial spares  $    174,952  
Ops Ctr  $ 1,936,473  
 NSC, OPC, AND SUAS SCHEDULES C.
The cost to procure and install the equipment is important, but so is the 
schedule of when this equipment is going to be installed. The project office provided 
a planned delivery schedule for the sUAS to the NSC fleet, starting with the first 
cutter in fiscal year (FY) 2016, which will be used for operational testing. Two NSCs 
will be outfitted per year until the last NSC is equipped in FY2020. The Operations 
Support Center will be outfitted in FY2019, and spare sUAS vehicles will be 
procured in FY2020. This schedule is shown in Table 7. 
Table 7. Project Office NSC sUAS Deployment Schedule 















Procure NSC  
#6&7 
 





The OPC deployment schedule is dependent on the OPC cutter delivery 
schedule. Ideally, the sUAS will be delivered when the new OPCs are delivered, 
avoiding the capability gap that the NSC fleet is currently experiencing. The OPC 
procurement plan calls for two phases, with multiple design contracts awarded in 
phase one and the best design chosen for cutter construction in phase two. The 
anticipated timeline for award of the phase one contracts is second quarter FY2014 
(Goodwin, 2013). Phase one contract award in second quarter FY2014 is about two 
quarters behind the preliminary schedule we received. This schedule calls for the 
first OPC to be delivered in mid-FY2020 (Office of Aviation Acquisition, personal 
communication, August 8, 2013). Based on the anticipated two-quarter delay in 
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contract award, we assumed the first OPC will be delivered in mid-FY2021 and 
procurements will follow the provided schedule with that one-year shift. The 
procurement schedule calls for one cutter each of the first three years and then two 
cutters per year until the entire fleet of 25 is delivered. This number has the potential 
to vary depending on factors such as cost, needs of the service, and the condition of 
other Coast Guard assets, but those are currently unknowns, so we used a 25-cutter 
OPC fleet size in this analysis. With a 20-year service life for the sUAS, this takes 
the life of the sUAS project to FY2055, which is the ending year for the LCC 
analysis. 
 PERSONNEL D.
We accounted for two types of personnel in this model: deployable AVDET 
personnel and shoreside personnel at the sUAS Operations Center. The sUAS 
CONOPS specifies that the AVDET would consist of three pilots and four mechanics 
(Assistant Commandant for Capability, 2013). This information varies from the two 
pilots and three mechanics that Aparicio and Wagner (2012) used based on their 
analysis because the CONOPS was released after their study. This seemingly small 
difference results in a $208,000 increase in costs per AVDET per year. For annual 
composite pay calculations, a senior pilot is defined as an O-3/4, a junior pilot as an 
O-2/3, a senior mechanic as an E-5/6, and a junior mechanic as an E-3/4. The 
composition of the AVDETs is shown in Table 8. 
Table 8. AVDET Composition and Annual Composite Pay 






Officer - Senior Pilot 1 $       162,022 $              162,022 
Officer - Junior Pilot 2 $       133,869 $              267,739 
Enlisted - Senior Mechanic 1 $         89,008 $                89,008 
Enlisted - Junior Mechanic 3 $         74,141 $              222,423 
Total Cost Per AVDET Per Year   $              741,193 
We equated the number of AVDETs required to the number of cutters 
supported. Unlike AVDETs that deploy with cutters in support of short range 
recovery (SRR) helicopters, the sUAS AVDET will meet the cutter in homeport and 
complete the entire patrol. AVDET personnel have the same employment standards 
as cutter personnel, which is a floating average of 185 days deployed per year. 
Although there will be personnel turnover within the AVDET personnel pool, the 
basic relationship of one AVDET per supported cutter holds. The pool of AVDET 
personnel varies with the number of cutters supported and ranges from nine pilots 
and 12 mechanics in FY2017 when three NSCs are supported to 99 pilots and 132 
mechanics when all eight NSCs and all 25 OPCs are online in FY2035. Personnel 
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costs are much higher than the procurement costs of the sUAS system and are 
second only to O&M costs. 
The Operations Center command and support staff requirements have not 
been fully determined. We worked with the project office and defined a notional 
staffing plan. For this analysis, we defined a basic command structure headed by an 
O-4 CO/OINC and supported by four O-3s and two CWO engineering officers (EO). 
We assigned four maintenance chiefs and 14 mechanics in support of the EO and a 
five-personnel administrative staff. The Operations Center staff is shown in Table 9. 
The makeup of this unit will need further study before its planned stand-up in 
FY2019. 
Table 9. Operations Center Staffing 





CO (O4) 1  $   174,343   $            174,343 
XO (O3) 1  $   149,702   $            149,702 
OPS (O3) 3  $   149,702   $            449,106 
Maintenance/EO (CWO) 2  $   148,126   $            296,252 
Maintenance Chiefs (E7) 4  $   116,356   $            465,424 
Mechanics (E4-E6) 14   $      81,472   $         1,140,617 
Admin (E4-E7) 5   $      88,558   $            442,790 
Total Cost Per Year    $         3,118,234 
 TRAINING E.
Training is vital to ensure that the Coast Guard is able to use sUASs to meet 
mission requirements. Specific training is required for pilots and maintainers. Our 
research (discussed previously in Section II.E., Error! Reference source not 
found.) found that training costs for large UASs such as Fire Scout are $45,000–
$48,000 (Heiss, 2012). Due to the much smaller size and reduced complexity of an 
sUAS as opposed to a UAS, the project office is using $10,000 as the estimated cost 
for training pilots on sUAS. We used this value, along with the $7,800 that Aparicio 
and Wagner (2012) used for maintenance training, in our analysis.  
There are two populations that need to be addressed for training: (1) 
personnel assigned to support new AVDET manning because of new cutter support 
and (2) personnel assigned due to turnover. We built our model to account for all 
training in the year that a new cutter, either NSC or OPC, comes online. For the 
second population of personnel, we used a turnover rate of 25%, equating to a 
standard four-year tour length. Of all the costs in this analysis, the personnel training 
cost is the lowest. 
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 OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE COSTS F.
The largest category of costs is O&M costs, accounting for over half of the 
total LCC, as can be seen in Figure 11. The Life-cycle Cost Tool displays these as 
discounted costs because the user can simply change the discount rate to 0% to 
obtain undiscounted costs. The O&M costs addressed in the analysis are 
organizational-level O&M, initial spares, spare-part carrying costs, transportation 
costs, and disposal costs. Preventive maintenance and depot-level costs have not 
been determined and are not part of this analysis. We discuss each of the included 
costs in turn.  
 
 Relative Relationships Between Discounted Cost Categories Figure 11.
1. Initial Spares 
Spare-part requirements are a function of many factors, including the number 
of systems, the amount of use (operations tempo), part reliability, and the amount of 
time that must be covered by the spares. Each of these components is discussed as 
follows. 
The amount of use that an sUAS part will see is tied to flight hours for most 
components or number of evolutions for the launch and recovery mechanisms. 
Determination of flight hours and launch/recover evolutions for sUAS deployed on 
NSC and OPC are discussed in the Section IV.F.3, Operational Availability. 
2. Organizational-Level Costs 
The failure time for a part or component is known as mean time between 
failures (MTBF). The DAU defines mean time between failures as  
for a particular interval, the total functional life of a population of an 
item divided by the total number of failures (requiring corrective 
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maintenance actions) within the population. The definition holds for 
time, rounds, miles, events, or other measures of life unit. A basic 
technical measure of reliability recommended for use in the research 
and development (R&D) contractual specification environment, where 
“time” and “failure” must be carefully defined for contractual 
compliance purposes. (Defense Acquisition University [DAU], 2012)  
More simply, MTBF is the amount of time or number of uses (i.e., sUAS 
launches) before a part is expected to fail. Values for MTBF are ideally determined 
by the manufacturer through testing programs. This is not always the case for new 
products or applications, and parametric estimation techniques are used to 
determine MTBF values for the system of interest. The principle behind MTBF 
calculations assumes that failures occur at a constant rate that can be approximated 
by an exponential distribution. While actual failures do not occur at a constant rate, 
the mean failure rate is constant. We used the same MTBF values as Aparicio and 
Wagner (2012), with a few exceptions. Based on the reliability information for military 
standard computers from Trenton Systems, we raised the MTBF for the GCS to 
42,720, which equates to five years of 24/7 operation without a failure (Trenton 
Systems, n.d.). We also lowered the MTBF for the remote boarding team video 
terminal to 250 hours based on personal experience using this technology in the 
field. This adjustment is not necessarily a mark against the system, but against the 
abusive treatment inflicted upon it by the users.  
We conducted sensitivity analysis of these changes on LCC to demonstrate 
the power and usefulness of the LCC tool. The GCS is the most costly single 
component of the system and the reduction in its MTBF causes spares to be 
required on the cutters, raising the total LCC by over 6%, as shown in Table 10. The 
video terminal has a cost of only $10,000 and raising its MTBF cased the two spares 
per cutter to no longer be needed, resulting in the 0.3% reduction in total LCC shown 
in Table 11. Table 12 displays the combination of both changes.  
Table 10. Change GCS MTBF From 42,720 to 4,000 
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Table 11. Change Video Terminal MTBF From 250 to 3,000 
 
Table 12. Change GCS MTBF From 42,720 to 4,000 and Video Terminal 
MTBF From 250 to 3,00 
 
MTBF values are shown in Table 13 for NSC. Since there are different 
numbers of air vehicles and flight hours on OPC, the expected failures per year and 
all sparing data vary from NSC even though they share the same MTBF. The MTBF 
values are adjustable in the model for when actual usage data are available. 
“Expected failures per year” (µ) is solved by Equation 1: 
 (1) 
where 
 = # failures 
 = # parts/system 
 = 1/MTBF 
 = time = # flight hours/patrol 
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Table 13. NSC System Component Failure Information 
 
We defined the amount of time that the system needs to be operational 
without spare-part resupply as the patrol length for a cutter. Logistical resupply is 
generally not an option for deployed cutters, so this was the minimum amount of 
time that must be covered. The patrol length is different for OPC and NSC and is 
user changeable.  
Required part or component reliability is accounted for in “Protection Level.” 
The DAU defines reliability as “…the probability that the system will perform without 
failure over a specified interval under specified conditions. Reliability must be 
sufficient to support the warfighting capability needed in its expected operating 
environment” (DAU, 2012). Protection level is expressed as a value between zero 
and one, and indicates the probability that when a part fails, a replacement will be 
immediately available. This is also known as “Customer Service Level” or “Spare 
Part Availability.” A zero protection level indicates that the part will never be 
available and one indicates the part will always be available. With limitless space 
and funding, we would all like to always have a spare part immediately, but this is 
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not realistic. Assignment of an appropriate protection level is a balance between the 
criticality of the part and the risk acceptance of not having a spare on hand. We 
identified two levels of parts in this analysis, and we designated critical or noncritical 
protection levels accordingly. Parts necessary for flight operation of the sUAS, such 
as wings and propulsion, were designated as critical with a protection level of 0.95. 
Other system components were designated as noncritical for flight and assigned a 
protection level of 0.75. The noncritical equipment list includes the system sensors 
because without them, the sUASs will still be able to fly and return to the cutter, even 
if they cannot perform the mission. Criticality for system components is the same for 
NSC and OPC. The critical/noncritical decision and the protection levels are 
adjustable in the model. Designated component criticality is displayed in Table 14. 
Table 14. sUAS Component Criticality 
 
Expected failures per patrol (shown in Table 13) and protection level were 
used to determine the initial sparring level for sUASs deployed on both classes of 
cutters, shown in Table 15 and Table 16. Using the component costs from Table 3, 
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we calculated initial spare costs along with the annual spare-part carrying cost using 
an annual carrying rate of 15%. 
Table 15. NSC-Required Spares and Costs 
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Table 16. OPC-Required Spares and Costs 
 
3. Operational Availability 
Operational availably (AO) is the “probability that a system or equipment, 
when used under stated conditions in an actual operational environment, will operate 
satisfactorily when called upon (i.e., at any random time)” (Kang, 2013). This 
measure is used by program managers as a trade off with cost to meet the user’s 
needs at the most economical cost. The calculation of AO is shown in Equation 2.  
 
 
CMDowntime = Corrective Maintenance Downtime 
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We calculated AO for NSC and OPC using CMDowntime and PMDowntime 
and also calculated AO using just CMDowntime to indicate the operational availability 
that should be expected on deployed cutters when no depot maintenance is 
planned. We used the same data for common maintenance times as Aparicio and 
Wagner (2012). These are shown in Table 17. 
Table 17. Corrective Maintenance Times 
     Two AV  One AV 
Maintenance Time to change Propulsion 4.00 hours 46.04 49.33 
Maintenance Time to change Wings 4.00 hours 13.81 14.80 
Maintenance Time to change AV Battery 1.00 hours 17.27 18.50 
Maintenance Time to change servos 4.00 hours 13.81 14.80 
Total Hours for O-Level Maintenance  hours 90.94 97.43 
Total Days of O-Level Maintenance  days 3.79 4.06 
Maintenance Required for D-Level (per vehicle)  days   10.00 
The corrective and preventive maintenance times were entered into Equation 
2 with flight hours for each cutter class used for TotalTime. The results are shown in 
Table 18. 
Table 18. Operational Availability for NSC and OPC 
NSC Operational Availability 0.808
OPC Operational Availability 0.818
Deployed Operational Availability 0.947
The presentation of AO along with LCC makes the Life-Cycle Cost Model we 
created more of a decision support tool for the program manager than simply a 
mathematical calculation tool. 
4. Operations and Maintenance Costs 
The cost to operate sUASs is dependent on the number of hours that the 
vehicles are flown. The sUAS CONOPS specifies one 12-hour mission per day 
(Assistant Commandant for Capability, 2013). Starting with this mission definition, 
the number of deployed days needed to be determined to calculate the number of 
flight hours per year. Standard employment rates for Coast Guard cutters are 185 
days per year. Each cutter would not be able to fly an sUAS every deployed day due 
to transit time, mid-patrol breaks, weather, and other factors. The standard 
deployment is 90 days for an NSC and 60 days for an OPC. The cutters’ operational 
areas are varying distances from homeport, so we applied factors of twice the 10- 
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and five-day transit times to NSC and OPC, respectively, to account for all of the 
days during a patrol when the sUASs would not be flying. We calculated 
employment percentages for each cutter using Equation 3:  
∗ 	   (3) 
Flight hours per year were calculated using Equation 4: 
 *  *  
Days
Employment Percentage MissionLength Flight Hours
Year
    (4) 
These data are shown in Table 19. Keep in mind that NSC flight hours are 
shared between two sUASs. 
Table 19. sUAS Flight Hours per Year on NSC and OPC 
Mission Length 12
Cutter Employment per year 185
OPC average patrol length 60
OPC average transit time 5
OPC employment percentage 83.33%
NSC average patrol length 90
NSC average transit time 10
NSC employment percentage 77.78%
Calculated % days in op area 80.56%
    
NSC UAS hours per year 1726.67
OPC UAS hours per year 1850
Like Aparicio and Wagner (2012), we used a calculated operational cost per 
flight hour. Wyle Laboratories (2010) completed a study for the Coast Guard that 
compared the MQ-8 Fire Scout to an SRR helicopter and found that the Fire Scout 
had an anticipated cost of $2,016 per flight hour. The Coast Guard stated that the 
cost per flight hour of sUAS “is projected to be only 10–15% of the cost of the Fire 
Scout procurement” (United States Coast Guard Office of Aviation Forces [CG-711], 
2010). Fifteen percent of $2,016 results in an sUAS cost per flight hour of $302. 
The maintenance cost per flight hour is based on the consumption of spare 
parts. Using the initial spare-parts costs for NSC and OPC of $1,727,617 and 
$1,497,168, respectively, and the flight hours per year from Table 19 results in 
annualized spare part costs per flight hour of $370 for NSC and $202 for OPC. 
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5. Transportation Cost 
Transportation cost in this model is defined as the cost to ship the sUAS 
system from the Operations Center to or from a cutter for deployment. The value of 
$290 was provided by the project office. 
6. Disposal Cost 
Disposal cost includes all costs to remove an asset from service. The DAU 
includes four processes/decisions in its definition of disposal—deactivation, 
disposition, demilitarization, and disposal (“Disposal and Disposition,” 2013). The 
sUAS is basically a commercially available system, so the disposal cost used in this 
analysis is 10% of procurement cost. 
 DASHBOARD G.
The value in developing an LCC model is that it is easily modified by the user 
through the interface screen, or dashboard. A screen capture is shown in Figure 12. 
We built the model using the most accurate data available and the current decisions 
in place, but the data and decisions may change in the future. As these changes 
occur, the inputs can be easily adjusted to reflect the new reality. The impacts of 
these changes are immediately available numerically and graphically. 
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 LCC Model Dashboard Screen Capture Figure 12.
The dashboard interface provides the user with more than a way to update 
data to reflect current conditions. Through this interface, the user can easily change 
multiple model inputs and see immediate impacts to LCC. This is useful for 
analyzing the effects of policy decisions and choosing the best course of action or 
answering budget and capability questions. For example, the current guidance 
defines the NSC sUAS system as two air vehicles, the OPC system as one air 
vehicle, and the AVDET as three pilots and four mechanics. A possible scenario is 
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that the AVDET composition may change and commanding officers will request 
additional air vehicles to support their missions, especially as swarm technology 
becomes more readily available. The user can remove one mechanic from the 
AVDET and change the OPC sUAS definition to 1.5 air vehicles, providing for one 
air vehicle when conducting fisheries patrols and two air vehicles when conducting 
counternarcotics or migrant interdiction patrols. In this case, there are higher 
procurement and O&M costs, but reductions in personnel and training costs result in 
an overall $43 million undiscounted savings over the life of the project. 
 SUMMARY H.
This chapter described the LCC tool that we developed to support the Coast 
Guard Office of Aviation Acquisition sUAS procurement. This quantitative tool 
provides information that the project office needs to manage the acquisition project 
and prepare for an upcoming ADE 2 decision. The output of the tool is an LCC 
based on a snapshot of the data and decisions that were current when we created 
the tool; however, the built-in adjustment ensures that future changes can easily be 
captured and an updated LCC provided. The tool also displays numerically and 
graphically the breakdown in costs by the major categories of procurement, 
personnel, training, and O&M. These categories are each funded by different 
sources, and the demands of this project on each of them must be supportable, or 
the entire project cannot succeed. 
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER 
RESEARCH 
 SUMMARY A.
As the Coast Guard endeavors to close the operational gaps created by the 
postponements in the NSC delivery schedule, it is important to assess the cost 
implications of sUASs on NSC with reasonable accuracy. The purpose of this 
research was to conduct an LCC analysis of sUAS deployment on Coast Guard 
cutters to assist the program management team. This research provides the 
program management team with an LCC analysis tool that incorporates the most 
current and accurate data available. We also provide research on current and 
emerging technologies in the sUAS field that could benefit the Coast Guard (e.g., 
swarm technology). Further, as the Coast Guard sUAS acquisition program 
requirements potentially change, the LCC analysis tool provides the program team 
with a custom tailored instrument that they can update themselves and use in 
providing accurate forecasting of LCC and program decision-making.  
1. LCC Tool 
The LCC tool created during the research project will directly support the 
Coast Guard Office of Aviation Acquisition in the attainment of an ADE 2 approval. 
The major cost components analyzed in the model are acquisition, personnel, 
training, O&M, and project office costs. Based on the information provided by the 
project office and this research and analysis, the tool outputs a detailed LCC broken 
down by these cost categories. The tool enables the user to determine the 
anticipated cost of the system and to budget appropriately in each cost category. 
The functionality of the tool is not limited to a static LCC. The user interface 
was designed to allow the user to easily change the model parameters and compare 
the resultant LCC. This is useful when updated information is available. It also 
enables the user to generate scenarios that could be used to answer budget, policy, 
or equipment questions and quickly see the outcomes numerically and visually. For 
example, if the manufacturer offers to switch to a more expensive propulsion system 
that has a higher reliability, the user can enter the new data and get an immediate 
answer about whether it is a cost-effective change. The composition of the sUAS 
Operations Center has not been finalized. The user can easily change the number 
and rank mix of personnel to see the LCC implications. In short, this LCC tool is 
more than just a single-use project. It is a tool that can be used over the long term to 
manage the sUAS project. 
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2. Market Research of sUAS Technology  
Additionally, we conducted research on emerging technology in the field of 
sUAS. This research provides information on what other agencies, such as the Navy 
and Air Force, in collaboration with the commercial market, are currently developing. 
The Navy has made significant advancements in the utilization of sUASs in 
operations. As sUAS payload technology has advanced, payload weights have 
significantly reduced. As a result, sUASs are becoming more capable of providing 
the same capabilities as larger UASs with the benefit of longer durations of flights. 
sUAS payloads are being utilized to contribute to operations in the collection of 
meteorology data, NBC disaster detection, search and rescue, and HA/DR.   
The Navy and commercial partners are also making advances in swarm 
technology. Swarm technology will revolutionize sUAS applications in the future and 
be the impetus for a paradigm shift in how UASs are utilized. The purchasing of a 
commercially developed and demonstrated swarm technology algorithm would 
greatly assist the Coast Guard by multiplying its ISR capabilities and increasing its 
effectiveness and efficiency in search and rescue operations. This research in the 
current state of sUAS technology reaffirms the value of the Coast Guard’s 
collaborating with the Navy in the development and acquisition of sUAS technology. 
The state of technology with aerial tagging capabilities is another promising 
area that can benefit the Coast Guard. This technology can be deployed by an sUAS 
and used to enhance the tracking of persons or vessels of interest by the sUAS or 
other Coast Guard assets. 
 AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH B.
1. Integration of Swarm Technology 
We reviewed the current and near-future state of swarm technology. There is 
a hardware cost for the additional air vehicles and additional maintenance costs for 
more flight hours, but there would not necessarily be additional personnel costs 
because the same AVDET could operate a swarm. The benefits of a swarm of 
sUASs under control of the cutter CO are tremendous. A substantially larger area 
could be searched in the same amount of time, or multiple sUASs with different 
sensors could be flown near each other to provide an enhanced surveillance 
capability. This technology has been demonstrated and should be reviewed by the 
Coast Guard for future integration. 
2. Further Research Into the sUAS as a Final Requirement Solution 
The literature review on the advances in emerging sUAS payload capabilities 
and swarm technology revealed the potential of sUASs to fulfill the long-term ISR 
requirements for NSCs. The utilization of sUASs as a final requirement solution 
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would have significant program life-cycle cost-savings implications when compared 
with the LCC of a large UAS such as the Navy’s MQ-4 Fire Scout. These 
technological advances, coupled with the reality of the fiscal constraints affecting the 
Coast Guard into the foreseeable future, highlight the need for further research to 
assess the potential sUAS as a final requirement solution.   
The unit cost and LCC of the sUAS should fall as this type of UAS moves into 
widespread commercial use in the coming years. There are already two sUAS 
platforms approved by the FAA for domestic use. There are both government 
(police, fire, search and rescue) and commercial uses for these vehicles. An ever-
expanding population of users will drive down the cost to procure and maintain the 
equipment while continually pushing the capability envelope. This is an opportunity 
for the Coast Guard to take advantage of its government/military position as an early 
adopter of the sUAS to provide some direction to the market and then capitalize on 
the benefits of an almost-COTS solution for long-term mission support.  
3. sUAS Operations Center Staffing Requirements 
The creation of the LCC model required a basic manpower analysis. We used 
the AVDET size specified in the sUAS CONOPS to determine the number of pilots 
and mechanics needed to support deployable components of the sUAS mission. We 
worked with the project office to determine a basic command structure for the 
Operations Center. Additional research to determine the optimal command structure 
and the rates and ranks required to fill out the shoreside support for the deployable 
sUAS mission has the potential to reduce the personnel LCC while enhancing 
operational support. 
4. Deployment on Legacy Assets 
The NSC program is in place to replace the aging WHEC cutters. This 
transition has already begun with NSC commissionings and WHEC 
decommissionings. The WMEC fleet is scheduled to be replaced by the OPC. 
However, the decommissioning of the WMEC fleet is not scheduled to start until the 
latter half of the second decade of this century and will not be completed until after 
2033. WMEC cutters will conduct hundreds of thousands of patrol hours before 
decommissioning. Deployment of sUASs to these platforms would provide the same 
enhanced mission effectiveness that is designed into the NSC and OPC platforms. 
5. Employment of Aerial Tagging Technologies 
There are multiple aerial deployed tagging technologies available or in 
development by numerous government agencies. Incorporating these technologies 
into the sUAS, or even current and future SRR helicopter, would enhance tracking 
capabilities. Narcotics traffickers know that a non-moving boat covered in a blue tarp 
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is very difficult to see and maintain visual contact with if discovered. The ability to 
actively tag this type of vessel with a marker that makes relocation or tracking easier 
will improve overall mission effectiveness. Another scenario would be to tag a 
person in the water. Once located, maintaining visual contact with a person can be 
difficult even in the calmest seas. Tagged persons would be more easily tracked 
until rescue assets arrive on-scene.  
 CONCLUSION C.
This research sought to assist the Coast Guard’s UAS program management 
team. We developed an LCC analysis tool based on the most current and accurate 
data. This tool has lasting value to the program team because it can be adjusted in 
the future to reflect the evolving program requirements environment and provide the 
associated changes’ cost implications. Additionally, we provided recommendations 
for further research into the implementation of enhancing technologies for sUASs on 
Coast Guard vessels, such as swarm technology. Swarm technology would increase 
an NSC’s ISR capabilities and potentially make sUASs a viable final requirement 
solution to fill the current NSC’s capabilities gap with potential cost-savings 
implications.   
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APPENDIX.  USER INSTRUCTIONS FOR VARIOUS SCENARIOS 
We provided some examples of how users could answer questions using the 
LCC Tool we created throughout this document. This section will provide some 
specific instructions for some selected scenarios. The format for these instructions is 
based on work by Keebom and Doerr (working paper (obtained from the authors)). 
The scenarios discussed include: 
 Reduction in project funding by X% due to sequestration or other 
external budget constraints 
 Change in policy allowing non-pilot-rated operators combined with 
reduced AVDET size. New AVDET will consist of a mission 
commander (officer) with five enlisted operators/maintainers. 
 Manufacturer offers to improve reliability of the propulsion system from 
150 to 500 hours MTBF for a $10,000,000. Is it worth it? 
 BUDGET REDUCTION A.
Forced budget reductions are not uncommon in acquisition projects and are 
not limited to sequestration. Project managers generally have to come up with 
answers to the effects on their project with 1%, 2%, 5%, and 10% reductions. The 
mathematical answer is known, but the important answer to higher ups is how the 
reduction was achieved. We will describe a 10% reduction in the scenario. 
One possible way to achieve a 10% reduction is to improve the reliability of 
some components. This would reduce spare parts costs and the overall LCC. In this 
example we improved the reliability of the launch and recovery systems to a MTBF 
of 250 launches and the propulsion system to a MTBF of 1000 flight hours. On the 
reliability section of the dashboard, values are changed by simply entering the new 
values in the yellow-background cells under the “User Defined Values” heading. The 
changes made are shown in Figure A1 and highlighted with red boxes. 
Figure A2 displays the resulting 10% reduction in LCC. 
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 Changes Made to MTBF Values Figure A1.
 
 Reduction in LCC Through MTBF Improvements Figure A2.
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 AVDET CHANGES B.
This scenario describes one possible outcome if the FAA determines that 
rated pilots are not required to pilot sUASs. The project office may need to 
restructure the AVDET personnel to consist of a mission commander and five 
enlisted operator/maintainers. 
Completing this change in the LCC Tool is more complicated than the above 
LCC reduction because information must be changed in multiple places. First, the 
personnel numbers that make up the AVDET are changed on the dashboard using 
the up and down arrows for the respective positions. These are highlighted by red 
boxes in Figure A3. The second change is to add flight training cost for the enlisted 
personnel. Since the model is built to only have officer pilots, the cost for flight 
training can be added as advanced mechanic training on the second worksheet in 
the tool titled “List Input Page.” The $10,000 for flight training was added as 
advanced maintenance training, shown in Figure A4. The results of these changes 
on LCC are shown in Figure A5. 
 
 Changes to AVDET Personnel Figure A3.
 
 Insertion of Pilot Training Costs Figure A4.
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 LCC Results of AVDET Composition Change Figure A5.
 PROPULSION SYSTEM IMPROVEMENT C.
The propulsion system is vital to operation of the sUAS, but it has a relatively 
high failure rate at 150 hours MTBF. The manufacturer understands this, but must 
conduct extensive R&D to improve the propulsion system to 500 hours MTBF. They 
estimate this R&D will cost $20,000,000 and requests the project office pay half the 
expense. Is this arrangement worth the investment? 
The change to propulsion system MTBF was discussed above. The numerical 
value is changed in the yellow-background slides, shown in Figure A6. The question 
then becomes, “Are there enough savings to cover the investment?” The resulting 
change in LCC is shown in Figure A7. We can see that there is a $30,000,000 
(undiscounted) savings in LCC by improving propulsion system reliably. This is a 
good use of the project’s money. The LCC Tool does not answer the question of 
where the project manager will find the money or whether the arrangement is in 
accordance with the contract, but it does provide the project staff with the 
information necessary to determine whether it is a worthwhile investment. 
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 Change Propulsion System MTBF Figure A6.
 








Undiscounted LCC 1,494,098,178$   (30,109,702)$       ‐1.98% 1,524,207,879$  
NPV of LCC 1,005,949,482$   (20,477,149)$       ‐1.99% 1,026,426,630$  
NSC Operational Availability 0.827 0$                            2.31% 0.808
OPC Operational Availability 0.836 0$                            2.28% 0.818
Deployed Operational Availability 0.966 0$                            1.97% 0.947
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